Russian participation in the conflict. The importance of Abkhazia for Russia

The Abkhazian kingdom arose in the 8th century. In the second half of the 9th century it became part of Georgia. In the 13th century, Abkhazia was conquered by the Mongol-Tatars, from the 16th century it was dependent on Turkey, and in 1810 it became part of Russia. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia recognized the territory of independent Georgia up to the Psou River, that is, in fact, Abkhazia as part of the newly formed Democratic Republic of Georgia.

This was enshrined in the Russian-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920, which states that “the state border between Georgia and Russia runs from the Black Sea along the Psou River to Mount Akhakhcha” (the Abkhaz section of the modern Russian-Georgian border).

On February 25, 1921, a Bolshevik coup took place in Georgia, and on March 4, 1921, Soviet power was established in Abkhazia.

Since December 16, 1921, the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic has been part of the Georgian SSR (since February 1931 - as an autonomous republic; since December 1990 - the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic). Both then, and during the existence of the Transcaucasian Federation (the unification of the Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in 1922-1936), and within the USSR, Abkhazia was considered as part of Georgia. The independence of Abkhazia is not confirmed by the Constitutions of either the Transcaucasian Federation or the USSR.

In 1931, the constitutional status of Abkhazia began to correspond to its actual legal status and was defined as an “autonomous republic within Georgia.” In accordance with the provisions of the Constitutions of both 1936 and 1977, autonomous entities were integral parts of the union republics and, naturally, did not have the right to secede from the union republic, especially from the USSR.

Tensions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy appeared periodically during the Soviet period. The migration policy, which began under the auspices of Lavrentiy Beria, reduced the share of Abkhazians in the total population of the republic (by the beginning of the 1990s it was only 17%). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians that were freed after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. The Abkhaz language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by compulsory study of the Georgian language, Abkhaz writing was transferred to a Georgian graphic basis (translated to a Russian basis in 1954).

Mass protests and unrest among the Abkhazian population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967 and - the largest - in May and September 1978.

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), a 30,000-strong gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and restore it to the status of a union republic.

On July 15-16, 1989, bloody clashes took place in Sukhumi between Georgians and Abkhazians (16 dead). The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during the period Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in power in Tbilisi.

A new aggravation of the situation in Abkhazia occurred in connection with the announcement by the Georgian authorities of the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978 and the restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1918, which declared Georgia a unitary state and excluded the existence of territorial autonomies. In Abkhazia, this was perceived as the beginning of a course towards complete assimilation of the small Abkhaz ethnic group, which by that time constituted a minority of the population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

On August 25, 1990, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia adopted the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which led to a split between the Abkhaz deputies and the Georgian faction of the Supreme Council, which opposed the Declaration.

On March 31, 1991, a referendum was held in Georgia, including Abkhazia, on the restoration of state sovereignty. In the Abkhaz ASSR, 61.27% of voters took part in the referendum, 97.73% of whom voted for the state sovereignty of Georgia, which amounted to 59.84% of the total number of voters in Abkhazia. Only 1.42% of those who took part in the vote, that is, 1.37% of the total number of voters, voted against. Throughout Georgia, 90.79% of voters took part in the referendum, 99.08% of whom voted for the restoration of state sovereignty of Georgia. Based on the results of the referendum, the Supreme Council of Georgia on April 9, 1991 proclaimed the Declaration on the restoration of state sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia.

After April 9, 1991, the Supreme Court of Abkhazia adopted normative acts in accordance with the legal framework of Georgia, and also introduced changes to the Constitution of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, to the Basic Law of Autonomy, which recognizes Abkhazia as an autonomous unit within Georgia, and the provision on being part of Georgia was not changed .

On September 25, 1991, elections were held in the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, a deputy corps was formed on a quota basis: 28 seats for Abkhazians, 26 for Georgians, 11 for representatives of other ethnic groups.

In early February 1992, political tensions in Abkhazia escalated due to the fact that, under the pretext of fighting supporters of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, units of the Georgian National Guard entered Abkhazia. The growing contradictions between the Abkhaz and Georgian factions of the Armed Forces reached their highest point on May 5, 1992, when the Georgian faction left the meeting. This parliament no longer met in its entirety.

Since June 1992, the process of creating armed formations began in Abkhazia: a regiment of internal troops of Abkhazia and local Georgian units.

On July 23, 1992, the Supreme Court of Abkhazia adopted a resolution on the termination of the 1978 Constitution of Abkhazia and the introduction of the 1925 Constitution, which fixed the pre-autonomous status of Abkhazia. This was not recognized by the central leadership of Georgia.

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was marked by the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of the liberation of Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia A. Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and the protection of communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.

The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over part of its territory and maintain its integrity. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and ultimately gain independence.

On the part of the central government were the National Guard, paramilitary formations and individual volunteers, on the part of the Abkhaz leadership - the armed formations of the non-Georgian population of the autonomy and volunteers (who arrived from the North Caucasus, as well as Russian Cossacks).

On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, during a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia), a document was signed providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.

By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993 hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, which was occupied by Georgian troops.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely abandon Abkhazia.

According to official data, approximately 16 thousand people died during the hostilities, including 4 thousand Abkhazians, 10 thousand Georgians and 2 thousand volunteers from various republics of the North Caucasus and South Ossetia.

Of the 537 thousand population of pre-war Abkhazia (as of January 1, 1990), of which 44% were Georgians, 17% Abkhazians, 16% Russians and 15% Armenians, 200-250 thousand people. (mostly of Georgian nationality) became refugees. Huge economic damage was caused to the economy of Abkhazia. The damage caused to Abkhazia by the war and subsequent events is estimated at $10.7 billion.

On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, an Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces was signed between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides through the mediation of Russia. Based on this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been deployed in the conflict zone since June 1994, whose task is to maintain the regime of non-renewal of fire.

A collective peacekeeping force, fully staffed by Russian military personnel, controls a 30-kilometer security zone in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. About three thousand peacekeepers are constantly in the conflict zone. The mandate of the Russian peacekeepers is set at six months. After this period, the Council of Heads of State of the CIS decides to extend their mandate.

In 1997, under the auspices of the UN, within the framework of the Geneva negotiation process, the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Council for the Resolution of the Conflict was created, which includes three representatives each from the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. Representatives of the UN and the Russian Federation also participate in the work of the council as a facilitating party. In 2001, its work was suspended due to the worsening of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. On May 15, 2006, the Coordination Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides resumed its work.

On April 2, 2002, the Georgian-Abkhazian protocol was signed, according to which Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers were entrusted with patrolling the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (the territory of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia). However, in June 2003, several UN mission employees were kidnapped there, after which patrols were suspended until the beginning of 2006.

The situation around the Kodori Gorge escalated on July 23, 2006 after anti-government statements by the former representative of the President of Georgia in the gorge, Emzar Kvitsiani, who until 2005 headed the paramilitary detachment "Hunter", formed from local residents to guard the Georgian-Abkhaz border. Kvitsiani demanded the dismissal of Georgia’s security ministers, who, according to him, are engaged in arbitrariness, and threatened official Tbilisi with actions of civil disobedience, and, in extreme cases, armed resistance.

On July 25, 2006, a military operation began in the Kodori Gorge, which official Tbilisi called a “police special operation.” On July 27, authorities reported that Emzar Kvitsiani, along with several dozen of his supporters, were blocked in the mountains. The Georgian military and police began large-scale cleansing operations in the villages of Kodori. Apart from those supporters of Emzar Kvitsiani who were captured by the Georgian military (according to some sources, about 80 people), most of the rebels voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.

On July 27, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced on national television that the Abkhaz government in exile would be stationed in the Kodori Gorge, which would exercise the jurisdiction of the central authorities of Georgia there. “This government of Abkhazia, expelled from Sukhumi in September 1993 and since then working in Tbilisi, is now declared the temporary administrative legitimate body of Abkhazia,” Saakashvili said.

The Abkhaz authorities in Sukhumi do not recognize the “government in exile” and are categorically against its presence in the Kodori Gorge.

On August 3, 2006, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced “the completion of the active phase of the anti-criminal police special operation in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge.”

On September 26, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that this region of Abkhazia, now controlled by the Georgian government, would be called Upper Abkhazia and that from September 27, the government of the Abkhaz Autonomy, previously operating in Tbilisi, would begin to function there. This date was not chosen by chance - September 27, the day of the fall of Sukhumi, is celebrated in Tbilisi as a tragedy, in Sukhumi as a holiday. After the expulsion of the rebellious field commander Emzar Kvitsiani from the Kodori Gorge in August, the Georgian authorities announced the full restoration of their jurisdiction over the gorge and their intention to locate the structures of the Abkhaz autonomy there. The reaction of “Lower Abkhazia” to this intention turned out to be painful and harsh. Sukhumi warned Tbilisi that it would do everything to prevent Tbilisi officials from entering the Kodori Gorge.

On October 13, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1716, which contains “a call on both sides to refrain from any actions that could impede the peace process,” and the UN Security Council “expresses its concern regarding the actions of the Georgian side in the Kodori Gorge in July 2006 in connection with all violations of the Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and Disengagement of May 14, 1994, as well as other Georgian-Abkhaz agreements regarding the Kodori Gorge.”

Today we will talk about the essence of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. This is the topic of the program prepared by Marina Perevozkina based on her personal impressions from her trip to the region.

Abkhazia has actually not been subordinate to Tbilisi for 9 years and is seeking recognition of its independence. Georgians and Abkhazians are different ethnic groups that do not have common roots and speak different languages. The Abkhazians, the indigenous population of Abkhazia, are related to the peoples of the Russian North Caucasus. Historians in Georgia and Abkhazia paint a completely different picture of what happened here over the centuries. However, it is an irrefutable fact that by the time it joined Russia in 1810, Abkhazia was an independent principality. The Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia was concluded at the end of the 18th century by the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, which in 1801 was included in the Empire by the royal manifesto. Since 1931, Abkhazia has been an autonomous republic within the union republic of Georgia. At the end of the 80s, a national movement was formed in Abkhazia, with the goal of secession from Georgia. In the summer of 1992, Abkhazia proclaimed its sovereignty, and in response, units of the Georgian army entered its territory. A war begins, which ended a year later with the complete victory of the Abkhazians and the almost complete expulsion of Georgians from Abkhazia. Since then, negotiations have been going on, with Russia and the UN acting as mediators. However, the position of Abkhazia, which has taken a course towards building an independent state, remains unchanged. This was confirmed in an interview with Deutsche Welle by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia Sergei Shamba:

“The document on the division of powers, which was prepared by a group of friends of the Secretary General, is not even offered to us yet, because they understand that there is no point in talking about this topic until the situation in the Kodori Gorge is resolved. This document has already been prepared, all participants in this group have approved it and now it should be handed over to the parties. We have repeatedly said that this document is unacceptable for us, because it presupposes a division of constitutional powers, which speaks of a single state and is built on the principles of the territorial integrity of Georgia, which is also unacceptable for us. Because the basis of our conflict is precisely our different views on this acute problem in the world: territorial integrity and the people’s right to self-determination. We proceed from the second principle, Georgians proceed from the first principle. This document a priori lays down the principle of the territorial integrity of Georgia. It is clear that we cannot accept it. These are fundamental issues for us. As soon as the Kodori Gorge problem is resolved, obviously we will face an attempt to hand over this document to us. And this will probably be serious pressure on the Abkhaz side. It is known that such pressure as is being exerted on the Abkhaz side has never been exerted anywhere in any negotiation process. Nevertheless, we intend to firmly defend our position on this issue. It hasn't been handed over to us yet. Although it says that it is not mandatory. But after we accept it, all the models that we will discuss will be based on the principle of respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia. We cannot take on such obligations. We are ready to discuss the interstate model of relations and peaceful coexistence.”

However, Georgian refugees from Abkhazia, who number approximately 240 thousand, are finding it increasingly difficult to accept the fact that they have to live far from their homes. Many of them blame Russia for everything, which, in their opinion, helped the Abkhazians during the war, and now is doing nothing to resolve the conflict. Georgian refugee:

“The conflict was provoked by Russia. Russia must leave, we Georgians and Abkhazians will stand against each other and make peace.”

In Abkhazia they have the exact opposite opinion on this matter. This is what the leader of the Union of Veterans of the Georgian-Abkhaz War, Harry Samanba, thinks:

“We see Abkhazia as a sovereign state, but at the same time we want to have very warm relations with Russia. We don’t want to have any others from Georgia or maybe from Turkey. We know who supported us when it was hard for us, who stood next to us. It's no secret: the volunteers are from the south of Russia. Some today say: the Chechens in Abkhazia did everything so that Abkhazia would find itself in a winning situation. Considering that I led military operations, I will tell you this: there were no more than 40 Chechens in my brigade, my brigade reached up to 5,000 people. And from the south of Russia they helped, lifted our spirit. But 95% of what was done and 95% of those killed were people of Abkhaz nationality. There were Armenians, because they live here, they occupy third place after the Russians in Abkhazia. They had a battalion, they were doing their job.”

After the war, the situation in Abkhazia seriously deteriorated twice: in May 1998 in the Gali region and last fall in the Kodori Gorge. The Kodor River, flowing through the gorge, crosses the entire Abkhazia and flows into the Black Sea about 30 km from Sukhumi. The upper reaches of the Kodor River are inaccessible mountainous areas inhabited by Georgian Svans. This is the only territory of Abkhazia not controlled from Sukhumi. The Svan community is led by the Tbilisi-appointed Governor of Mountain Svaneti, Emzar Kvitsiani. The Kodori Gorge is a kind of corridor from Western Georgia to Abkhazia. On the Georgian side, at the entrance to the gorge, there are two posts of Russian peacekeepers, but passing them unnoticed along mountain paths is not particularly difficult for people who know the area. It was in this way that international militant detachments under the command of the Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev entered Abkhazia in the summer and autumn of last year. Five prisoners who took part in the autumn events are being held in Sukhumi: two Chechens, a Kabardian, a Svan and a Mingrelian. Megrelian Gervasi Jologua, a native of the village of Kvemo Borgebi in the Gali region of Abkhazia, became the local guide who helped the militants get into the Kodori Gorge. Here is what he said about his meetings with Gelayev:

“We met three times. He left the impression of an absolutely decent person. We did not have such an agreement to fight. He was interested in having more than one location. Apparently, he wanted to expand his capabilities. But I don’t know who got him involved and how. At first they wanted to make a base in Mingrelia. I helped transport 70 people close to Gelayev to Mingrelia. This was at the end of July. In the Pankisi Gorge we took cars from the Kists. We had three vehicles in total: K-66 and two KAMAZ. They organized all this, we were waiting for him at the exit of the city of Akhmeta. We didn't even go into the gorge. We knew that 29 internal troops were changing in the gorge. We covered the cars with a tarpaulin and at high speed with the headlights on, no one suspected that these were unofficial cars. Everyone thought that these were the vehicles of the internal troops. So we reached the Tsalenjikha region. We made a throw of almost 600 km. Then the Georgian government forced us to leave there. They feared that Chechen fighters were too close to Russian peacekeepers. Then something incomprehensible began to happen, I could not control everything. Then these people became not 80, but 200. Then, when we ended up in Saken, there were more and more of them. I couldn’t control everything: where they came from and who brought them. We bypassed the Russian post, we bypassed it so much that they could not see us. I will say that there are such places where you can go around them freely, so the peacekeepers are not to blame for anything. The Russian military was completely unaware of what was happening there. At the beginning of September we were already on the territory of Abkhazia. We were in Saken, this is the beginning of the Kodori Gorge, and crossed the Khida Pass.”

I ask listeners to take into account that this man is now under investigation and is about to be put on trial in Abkhazia. Abkhazians claim that the entire action to transfer militants from the Pankisi Gorge, bordering Chechnya, to the Kodori Gorge on the territory of Abkhazia was organized by the Georgian special services. For example, Deputy Minister of Defense of Abkhazia Harry Kupalba thinks so.

The deputy minister says that everything was organized by the Secretary of the Security Council Sajaya, who recently committed suicide. Maskhud Dzhabrailov is a native of the Vedeno district of Chechnya. He is 25 years old. He was captured by Abkhaz militias last fall. Since last spring I have been in the Pankisi Gorge. There, according to him, there were well-known Chechen field commanders:

“Abdul-Malik was. He is a Wahhabi commander. He is a Chechen, but the Chechens consider him their enemy. There was a time that he fought against the Chechens, after the first war. Wahhabis live separately. It is impossible to make friends with them. They are some kind of closed and peculiar people. They mainly live in the forest. Gelayev was also there. I don’t know him personally, but I saw him when we were driving here. I know him by sight. I think that the Chechens will not forgive him either. I think the Chechens think he set them up.”

Maskhud claims that he and many other ordinary Chechens were deceived: they did not know that they were being taken to Abkhazia. Gelayev promised them a quick return home to Chechnya.

“They said that the cars into which the Gelayevsky detachment was loaded were going to Chechnya. I decided to go home. All the refugees said this. They brought me here, I couldn’t leave anywhere, I don’t know Georgia. We knew that we were in Georgia. They were completely packed like a detachment, and they had with them the things and weapons that a military man should have. I was also given a weapon. I had a machine gun and two horns. They said they would take me home to Chechnya. They were going to fight for Chechnya. There were 200-250 people. We were transported in KAMAZ military vehicles. The ones who drove us were Georgians in military uniform. A helicopter arrived, ammunition and food were brought. When we were near the reservoir, the Chechens who came from Chechnya on foot said: there was such a lake when we went to Georgia. Even near the reservoir we still thought that we were going to Chechnya. We were forbidden to communicate with Georgians. They were separate from us. But they mixed in their movements. I personally realized that we were in Abkhazia when there were military clashes, and one Georgian said: behind that mountain is the village where I was born. We are in Abkhazia. The three of us decided to leave the detachment at the first opportunity. This is not at all what I need. 130 Chechens died for Abkhazia. I knew some people who fought for Abkhazia. These are very good guys. We found out that we were framed. They said that they were taking them to Chechnya, but they ended up in Abkhazia.”

In the fall, Georgian troops were brought into the Kodori Gorge following the militants. According to Tbilisi, to protect civilians living there. Sukhumi is now seeking the withdrawal of these troops. On April 2, the parties signed an agreement in which both the Georgian and Abkhaz sides pledged to withdraw their armed forces from the gorge. The withdrawal of Georgian troops was to be completed on April 10. The Abkhaz side accuses its opponents of disrupting the agreement. Meanwhile, information appeared that Gelayev and detachments of North Caucasian militants had again moved to the Kodori Gorge. Since the end of February, the Abkhaz armed forces have been on high alert. But if war breaks out in Kodori, much will depend on whether the population of the Gali region in Abkhazia's easternmost region, populated by ethnic Mingrelian Georgians, will support it. Partisan detachments from among local residents operate in this area: the White Legion and the Forest Brothers. Last fall, according to the head of the district administration, Ruslan Kishmaria, everything was calm here:

“The partisan commanders waited to see how it would end in Kodori, but local residents even held a rally that they would not participate. In general, the situation has improved, the population’s trust in the authorities has increased.”

For 9 years now, Abkhazia has been living like a besieged fortress. We will talk about how such a life affects the psychology of people and the internal political situation in the republic in the next program.

Since Tuesday morning, the authorities of Abkhazia have closed traffic on the bridge over the Inguri River, where theadministrative boundary between the Zugdidi region of Georgia and the Gali region of the unrecognized republic, a source in the regional police of the Georgian region of Samegrelo told RIA Novosti.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is one of the most acute interethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Tensions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy appeared periodically during the Soviet period. The migration policy carried out under Lavrentiy Beria led to the fact that Abkhazians began to make up a small percentage of the region’s population (by the beginning of the 1990s they were no more than 17% of the total population of Abkhazia). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians that were freed after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. The Abkhaz language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by compulsory study of the Georgian language. Mass protests and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest in May and September 1978.

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), the 30 thousandth Gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and restore it to the status of a union republic.

On July 15-16, 1989, clashes occurred between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi. The riots reportedly killed 16 people and injured about 140. Troops were used to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during the period Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in power in Tbilisi.

On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the 1978 Constitution of the Georgian SSR and the restoration of the 1921 Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic.

The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet Constitution of Georgia as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the Constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision The Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized internationally).

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was marked by the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and protecting communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.

On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an Agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely abandon Abkhazia.

The armed conflict of 1992-1993, according to the data released by the parties, claimed the lives of 4 thousand Georgians (another 1 thousand were missing) and 4 thousand Abkhazians. The autonomy's economic losses amounted to $10.7 billion. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half the population) were forced to flee Abkhazia.

Collective peacekeeping forces, fully staffed by Russian military personnel, control a 30-kilometer security zone in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. About three thousand peacekeepers are constantly in the conflict zone. The mandate of the Russian peacekeepers is set at six months. After this period, the Council of Heads of State of the CIS decides to extend their mandate.

On July 25, 2006, units of the Georgian armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (up to 1.5 thousand people) were introduced into the Kodori Gorge to conduct a special operation against local armed Svan formations (“militia” or the “Monadire” battalion) of Emzar Kvitsiani, who refused to obey the demands of the Minister of Defense Georgia's Irakli Okruashvili to lay down his arms. Kvitsiani was accused of “treason.”

Official negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were subsequently interrupted. As the Abkhaz authorities emphasized, negotiations between the parties can only resume if Georgia begins to implement the UN Security Council Resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of troops from Kodori.

On September 27, 2006, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, by decree of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia. In the village of Chkhalta, on the territory of the gorge, the so-called “legitimate government of Abkhazia” is located in exile. Abkhaz military formations controlled by Sukhumi are stationed a few kilometers from this village. The Abkhaz authorities do not recognize the “government in exile” and are categorically against its presence in the Kodori Gorge.

On October 18, 2006, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia appealed to the Russian leadership with a request to recognize the independence of the republic and establish associated relations between the two states. For its part, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stated its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was marked by the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and protecting communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.

On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an Agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely abandon Abkhazia.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

War, conflict, power confrontation are always tragic. Especially if the process lasts for decades. Georgia and Abkhazia know firsthand about such a disaster - the conflict between them serves as a vivid example of national discord and enmity. But why did this happen? This will be discussed further.

Where did it all start?

There are several points of view on the problem of confrontation between the two Caucasian peoples. One of them is a moderate concept, according to which there is no acute confrontation between Georgians and Abkhazians, as, for example, between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. That historically these are two culturally and ethnically close people. Mutual hatred took root only after the immediate conflict. It was caused artificially with the help of propaganda in the media and various political technologies.

But then one unclear question remains. How to explain such hostility? It cannot arise out of nowhere using only political PR technologies.

Another concept provides answers to these questions. It is based on the presence of centuries-old contradictions between the two peoples.

Background

The Abkhaz are a people ethnically and culturally close to the Adyghe people. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, it did not have independence, but had autonomy as part of various subjects of the Russian Empire.

Until the beginning of the 19th century, the principality was formally under the protectorate of Turkey. Only in 1810 did the Abkhazians begin to “integrate” into Russia.

Until 1864, the principality had autonomy, which it lost in 1866. It is worth saying that the local residents did not accept this with resignation. Two years later, mass uprisings and protests began. The situation was aggravated by the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The Abkhazians chose the side of the enemy. This is quite logical, since the old-timers remembered the times when the country was autonomous within Turkey. The Russian Empire resolved the issue in two ways:

Forced relocation outside the empire.
Territorial reforms.

At the end of the century, modern Abkhazia was divided. The Sukhumi district was subordinate to the Russian administration in Tiflis, Gagra and its environs were part of the Black Sea province.

We can conclude that historically the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia has been long overdue. 1992 was only the beginning of hostilities, the consequences of which have not yet been eliminated. Without accepting anyone’s point of view, I would like to note that before joining the USSR, the autonomy was never completely part of Georgia.

Georgia and Abkhazia: conflict. Reason for the confrontation

Administrative reforms of the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union, led to armed confrontation. As the president of our country, V.V. Putin, said, the communists laid not even a mine, but an atomic time bomb under the foundation of the future state, dividing the country into national, rather than territorial, autonomies. The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is an example, or rather, a confirmation of these words The once divided territory under the USSR became a single autonomy within the Georgian SSR.

The image of the “enemy” in the minds of Abkhazians

It began to appear and be planted in the early 30s. The history of the period of revolution and civil war with the subsequent “Sovietization” of the state somehow treated Abkhazia unfairly. Having supported the Bolsheviks against Menshevik and White Guard Georgia, it was subsequently annexed to the latter, only now Soviet. The image of the enemy already began to form in the minds of many. After all, the struggle between whites and reds here took on the character of a completely natural inter-ethnic massacre. Of course, both Georgia and Abkhazia suffered.

The conflict thus flared up on the basis of the Civil War. Some supported the Mensheviks and White Guards. These are Georgians. Abkhazians - Bolsheviks. But after the victory of Lenin’s party, the latter unfairly found themselves in the role of the vanquished. The defeat of the losing side later bore fruit.

Since the 1930s, the cultural and legal arbitrariness of Georgians towards the Abkhazians began. From that time on, Stalin's power in the country was unconditional. Georgians become full-fledged “masters” of the Caucasus.

The “offensive” on Abkhazia begins in all areas:

The first of two republics to be "downgraded" in status. The very fact that the Autonomy became part of the Georgian SSR speaks of the contemptuous attitude towards the Abkhaz people on the part of the authorities. This was perceived painfully among the intelligentsia and the older generation. Georgians are enemies in their eyes. The point is not so much the loss of the status of a separate republic, but rather who exactly Abkhazia was annexed to.
Georgian graphics are being introduced into the alphabet.
Education at school has been translated into the “enemy” language.
Georgians are being taken to Abkhazia. Over several decades, the ratio of migrants to the indigenous population was 48 to 52. That is, almost half of the number came from Georgia, who enjoyed various benefits, including priority when hiring. Such measures disenfranchised people on their own land, which could not but have a negative impact on the relations between the two neighboring peoples.
The media in Abkhazia broadcast only in Russian and Georgian. Which also gave rise to discontent among the local population, who revere their tradition and culture.

After the Stalinist regime, a period of “thaw” began in the country. He brought the mountain people media in their language, native speech at school, and a reduction in discrimination.

Now we can ask a logical question: “Did Abkhazia have a conflict with Georgia?” History gives a positive answer.

Attempts to leave the GSSR

During the second half of the 20th century, the Abkhazians repeatedly tried to secede from the Georgian SSR. Several times the national intelligentsia addressed Moscow with official collective letters. The most famous one dates back to 1977. In history it was called “Letter 130”. The entire Abkhazian intelligentsia, all famous and respected people of the autonomy put their signatures in it. “Letter 130” was popularly regarded as a kind of referendum on secession from Georgia. In it, residents asked to annex the autonomy either to Russia, or to create a separate republic, as was the case before Stalin.

The Abkhaz regional committee accused the people who signed the letter of slander. In 1978, a special congress was held on this occasion. All communist leaders condemned the “Letter,” calling the organizers “conspirators.” Thus, we can say with confidence that Abkhazia had a conflict with Georgia. The history of their confrontation began not with the “bloody” 1992, but much earlier.

During this period, the authorities begin to “pacify” the population:

The Georgian alphabet was removed. Instead, the Cyrillic alphabet appeared.
They allowed free broadcasting in their native language, which, along with Russian and Georgian, was recognized as the state language on the territory of the autonomy.
They limited the resettlement of Georgians to Abkhazia, which was previously actively supported.

First victims

At the end of the 80s. XX century, the Union began to burst at the seams. It became clear that interethnic confrontations were about to break out. The Georgian leadership needed to carefully approach the resolution of the Abkhaz issue. Instead, the leaders of the Republican Communist Party, Patiashvili and Gumbaridze, who replaced him in 1989, began to flirt with the nationalists, hoping to retain power in the event of the collapse of the USSR.

The situation became so tense that the Aidgylara forum, on behalf of the residents of the entire autonomy, turned to Gorbachev with a request to join the RSFSR. In case of refusal, they demanded that a special management procedure be immediately introduced. Moscow simply ignored these demands.

The period from July 15 to 18, 1989 was remembered for a long time by Georgia and Abkhazia: the conflict for the first time escalated into an armed confrontation. The first victims appeared. 12 people died. Everyone understood that these were only the “first signs”; a large-scale military conflict was just around the corner. Georgia and Abkhazia begin preparations.

The collapse of the USSR: the inviolability of borders or the right of a nation to self-determination?

So what about Georgia and Abkhazia? This question is very difficult to answer immediately and unambiguously. In the section “Georgia and Abkhazia: conflict. Reason”, we examined the roots of historical contradictions. After the collapse of the Soviet state, legal ones were added to them. However, it was not only the warring parties that faced such problems. Many former union republics, autonomies and national entities found themselves faced with a difficult choice: what to do in this situation?

Legal rules that contradicted each other

The principle of the inviolability of Georgia's borders in accordance with the UN Resolution.
The right of peoples to self-determination. Also a norm of international law signed by the UN. In addition, under Lenin, despite all the objections of his close circle in the party, including Stalin, he introduced into the draft union treaty the principle of federalism with the free right of republics to secede from the Union. Autonomous okrugs and national entities also had this right.

In practice, of course, this did not happen. This is only a nominal declaration. Abkhazia tried three times to secede from Georgia. But she was refused.

But! The official communist congress never confirmed the right of the people of Abkhazia to secede. That is, in fact, the leadership of the autonomy did not support the demands of the population. Consequently, the legal principle of voluntary withdrawal was not violated until 1989.

The administrative apparatus system itself was built in such a way as to prevent the official collapse of the USSR. With Gorbachev coming to power, everything changes dramatically. The principle of democratic decision-making has now been proclaimed. Even the head of state himself became the president elected in the popular elections, and not the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. It follows that now it is not the committees of the Republican parties who decide whether to grant the notorious right of exit, which was impossible in principle, but the people themselves. It was Abkhazia that wanted to take advantage of this right.

1992 and the transition to the new “old” Constitution

We are talking specifically about the Constitution of 1925. The same one where Lenin “allowed” all republics to freely secede from the USSR. Following the example of the USA, when the first “free” states voluntarily joined the state and could easily leave it. In both countries, no one has ever exercised this right due to impossibility.

But the Supreme Council of Abkhazia decided to defend this right and secede from Georgia. If in 1977 and 1989 the people wanted this without the support of the regional committee, now the official highest body of power, in unity with the majority of ordinary citizens, announced their withdrawal.

According to the Constitution of 1925, Abkhazia is a sovereign state, which, on the principles of voluntariness and equality, is part of the USSR. Of course, from a legal point of view, no one had any right to deprive it of the status of a republic and “transform” it into autonomy. But at the moment the country lived under the 1978 Constitution, which made such an act illegal.

Start of the war

On June 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of Autonomy announced the transition to the 1925 Constitution, according to which the country is an independent subject of law. A month later, Georgia joined the UN, which gave it the opportunity to legally “secure” the border of the republic that existed before the collapse of the USSR. Now the Abkhazians, from the point of view of international law, were separatists who undermined the foundations of the constitutional order. An armed conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is becoming inevitable.

Stages of confrontation

1989-1992 - political and legal. Both sides tried to defend their point of view using legal methods. The Abkhazians argued that the act of their country joining Georgia was not legal. According to the Constitution of 1925, this state joined the USSR on an equal basis. This means that the subordination of one subject to another is not justified. The struggle took place within the “Abkhazian” society. The policy of encouraging migration from Georgia has done its job. A split formed in society. The “legal correctness” of Abkhazia was justified by Georgia itself, which was one of the first to try to secede from the USSR. This position was justified by the nation’s right to self-determination. Consequently, Abkhazia can also take advantage of the same principle and secede from Georgia.
1992-1994 - armed confrontation.
1994-2008 - an attempt to peacefully resolve the situation.
2008 - present - escalation of the conflict. “5-day war” and Russia’s participation in the armed conflict. Declaration of independence. But nothing changes. Now Georgia and Abkhazia are already in conflict, independent from each other. Briefly about this a little later.

Georgia itself destroyed the regulatory framework that justified the presence of Abkhazia within its structure. In 1992, she abandoned the 1978 USSR Constitution. That is, she created a precedent that divides herself into parts.

In August 1992, regular Georgian troops with heavy artillery and tanks were introduced into Abkhazia. A large-scale war began. Apart from victims, it brought absolutely nothing to Georgia. The powerful community within the autonomy (240 thousand people) did not give anything. The calculation for the internal front did not materialize. In addition, there were two Georgian enclaves in Gagra and Gantiadi, which were abolished. Their residents were expelled from the country.

Consequences

The powerful Georgian diaspora (almost half of the total population), which for decades gradually poured into Abkhazia, destroying it from the inside, suddenly left the autonomy. The war brought about 20 thousand deaths, which is a lot for such small states.

Refugees as a business

A paradoxical story has been happening to refugees over the years. According to international law, these are people who need help in interstate conflicts. These are the Georgian refugees who left Abkhazia.

But a strange picture: in total, 240 thousand Georgians lived in Abkhazia, who left there (to different countries). But official sources give a different figure - 300 thousand. The situation is clarified by the financial assistance provided to refugees. The UN allocates $6 per person per day. The money is received by the official treasury of Georgia, which is quite satisfied with such a subsidy. Naturally, “refugees” appeared, for whom the budget receives a decent amount. According to official sources, 1 million 800 thousand dollars a day comes from UN assistance.

It follows from this that the legal status of independence of Abkhazia is recognized by Georgia. Because the UN is obliged to help refugees. Therefore, by demanding financial assistance, Georgia recognizes that these people are from another independent state. After all, the UN is not obliged to provide financial assistance in the event of a conflict within a particular country.

"5-day war". Help from the Russian Federation

Georgia's internal conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia has grown into an international conflict with Russia. This happened in August 2008. Georgian artillery opened fire on the peaceful cities of the Autonomy, despite the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent under the UN flag in them.

This act was regarded by Russian President D. A. Medvedev as genocide of the peaceful South Ossetia. Guided by the Constitution, according to which the state protects its citizens, and there were many of them on the territory of the autonomy, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered to “protect” the civilian population and carry out an act of “peace enforcement.” Russian regular troops entered Abkhazia.

Soldiers who have been there have the right to benefits for participants in the armed conflict. Abkhazia and Georgia are foreign entities. This means that the one who was there has the status of a war veteran, and not a participant in the anti-terrorist operation, as in the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan.

The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia ended 5 days later with a referendum on the independence of the republic. Of course, few people recognize this status on the world stage.

It is worth noting that the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia in 2008 is the first armed war, from the point of view of international law, in which Russia took part since the Second World War.

Results

Two independent countries appeared on the international scene - Georgia and Abkhazia. Despite this, the conflict did not disappear. Both sides will always defend their rights. Now Abkhazia is supported by Russia, which could not do this in 1992-1994. The confrontation is ongoing, diplomatic and economic methods are being used. But it seems that peace in the Caucasus will be established between these two peoples only when each recognizes the nation’s right to self-determination. After the Saakashvili regime, Georgia is trying to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow. Fewer and fewer claims are being made to these territories. However, everyone understands that Georgia will never accept the loss of these lands. The conflict has not yet been resolved.